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I1   
The idea that films can be philosophical goes back to, at least, the 70s, with Stanley 
Cavell’s The World Viewed: Reflections on the Ontology of Film (1971), and Gilles 
Deleuze’s Cinéma 1: L’image-movement (1983) and Cinéma 2: L’image-temps 
(1985).   
But, the “film as philosophy” (FAP) hypothesis turned into a field in its own 
right during the 2000s, after Stephen Mulhall’s On Film (2001). In this work, 
Mulhall defended that some films philosophize for themselves—they are not just 
“philosophy’s raw material” but can think “seriously and systematically just the 
ways that philosophers do.”2    
The aforementioned caused controversy. Around the same time of On Film 
’s release, Bruce Russell published the article “The Philosophical Limits of Film” 
(2000). This article had one of the first attacks against FAP, posing some main 
objections based on metaphilosophical grounds, which were called the “generality” 
and the “explicitness” objections. These objections made by Russell and by Murray 
Smith are based on the idea that film and philosophy are too different in their 
purposes or ways of presentation, ideas that are grounded in implicit or explicit 
conceptions of philosophy.   
In this chapter, I will analyze these, as well as some other 
metaphilosophically grounded objections, as I will try to draw a line of reasoning 
connecting to attempts of responding to them. After doing so, I will conclude that 
their metaphilosophical grounds are implausible, and, thus, they are not definite 
objections against FAP.    
 
II   
The generality objection is concerned with the fact that FAP’s advocates are usually 
interested in fictional narrative films, which are fictional and particular cases. 
Philosophy, on the contrary, has “universalistic aspirations,”3 as it seeks to assert 
general or universal theses.   
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Bruce Russell defended that “film can vividly introduce philosophy 
problems and can solve some problems by showing us what is possible. But it 
cannot show us what is probable and sometimes not even what is possible.”4 
According to him, a film like Crimes and Misdemeanors (Woody Allen, 1989) can 
show us a possible outcome of a crime, and A Simple Plan (Sam Raimi, 1998) can 
show a probable one.5 According to Russell, besides its capacity to introduce 
philosophy and to show what is possible or probable, film can also “refute a 
philosophical thesis, say, that necessarily wrongdoing will make you unhappy or 
will be contrary to your self-interest.”6 However, the main limit film has is that it 
cannot establish philosophical theses since “no one can establish that something 
holds in all possible worlds by presenting an example or two of a possible world 
depicted in film.”7 Therefore, the philosophical interest one can find in film is 
limited.   
Faced with this problem, philosophers usually appeal to thought 
experiments (TEs). As Noël Carroll says, thought experiments are “frequently 
employed by philosophers to defend and/or motivate their claims,” and “if 
philosophy conducted by means of thought experiments is an adequate source of 
knowledge and education, then so literature should be.”8 Philosophers frequently 
use these imaginary cases, the fictional narratives that films are.   
Thought experiments, in philosophy, can have several functions. Thomas E. 
Wartenberg identifies six kinds: TEs that function as counterexamples to a certain 
philosophical thesis, TEs that seek to establish possibilities, the failed TEs that 
demonstrate impossibilities, TEs that establish necessary connections, TEs that 
seek to confirm theories or TEs through which philosophers construct certain 
theories.9   
As we saw, Russell accepts only that films can function as counterexamples 
to philosophical theses. Wartenberg, on the other hand, famously argued that The 
Matrix (Lili and Lana Wachowski, 1999) is a TE that establishes the “deception 
hypothesis,”10 the possibility that what seems to be real is just a complete illusion, 
specifically a simulation created by super-intelligent machines. Noël Carroll too 
argued Ernie Gehr’s Serene Velocity (1970) is a thought experiment that puts the 
hypothesis that “movement is an essential feature of cinema.”11   
This appeal still does not convince everyone, however. For example, 
Richard Eldridge believes an argument for cinematic thought experiments to be 
uninteresting since in philosophy they are minor projects.12 Wartenberg, however, 
notes that although these tools are a fraction of what philosophy does, TEs are 
sometimes central in philosophical texts, such as is the Evil Genius hypothesis by 
Descartes. Thus, Wartenberg argues that “what we need to do is emphasize the 
importance and vivacity of such thought experiments in philosophy proper to give 
the thesis that films contain philosophical thought experiments more punch and 
greater plausibility.”13 Here, the appeal to TEs may be more than just a   
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defensive strategy: it can also be something films are especially good at doing. 
Note, however, that if we want to argue that films philosophize as a TE (in 
philosophy) does, we must accept that TEs are good and important contributions to 
philosophy; otherwise, we will instantly relegate films to bad or unimportant 
philosophy. It seems that if our argument is that films can be good philosophical 
works, we must make some kind of argument that shows why TEs are good 
philosophical tools.   
Even with arguments for the idea that films are cinematic TEs, some caveats 
have been put forward.   
In philosophy, TEs do not come isolated; they are explicitly and clearly 
framed within a more extensive argument or philosophical work and have clear 
purposes explained by their authors. I link this realization to two other objections: 
the explicitness and the propriety objection.   
The explicitness objection states that film “lacks the explicitness to 
formulate and defend the precise claims that are characteristic of philosophical 
writing.”14   
Murray Smith, for example, argues that “while philosophy seeks to clarify 
our understanding of the world, the vocation of art is to deliver an adventure in 
perception, cognition, and emotion.”15 He, furthermore, states that, if on the one 
hand, the value of works of art lies in properties such as “complexity, ingenuity, 
inventiveness, density, ambiguity, and profundity,”16 philosophy is primarily 
valued in epistemic terms, which seems to go against film’s ambiguity adequate for 
its artistic status. As he asserts “few criticisms are more apt to strike terror into the 
heart of the philosopher than the assertion that such-and-such a proposition is 
‘ambiguous,’ while in the world of art, that term is more apt to be used as a term of 
praise.”17   
This idea is also defended when the “propriety objection” is posed. This 
Hegel-inspired objection,18 as Paisley Livingston poses it, states that art has a 
proper value that is intrinsic, not instrumental. So, the artistic value should not be 
reduced to non-artistic purposes, such as philosophical ones.19   
Such objections are also applied specifically to cinematic TEs. Deborah 
Knight, for example, argues that a cinematic TE is focused on what is aesthetically 
relevant, like the narrative structure, genre or characters, and not on the concepts, 
as philosophical TEs do.20 For Knight, this is because “they have different 
characteristics and different goals.”21   
So, if cinematic TEs lack the explicitness that philosophical TEs have, this 
is both a sign that cinema and philosophy have different proper values and a 
problem to an argument that focuses on the potential philosophical value of 
cinematic TEs.   
This also relates to the generality objection: as we saw, Russell thinks 
philosophy seeks to establish general theses and to do so we should not rely on 
fictional narrative singular cases. To establish such general theses, philosophers 
resort to some kind of justification, usually to explicit   
´ 
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arguments. The problem here is that thought experiments are not arguments per se. 
For Russell, “thought experiments can be a stimulus to argumentation, can motivate 
the listener, reader, or viewer to produce an argument, but they are not arguments 
themselves.”22 As TEs are not arguments, they usually are framed within proper 
arguments,23 and this is not what happens with cinematic TEs. We could say that 
TEs in philosophy are very commonly used to pose a counterexample to a supposed 
necessary theory; i.e., if this scenario x is possible, that contradicts the necessary 
theory y. On the other hand, it is possible that Russell thinks that TEs cannot 
establish general theses by themselves because, as they are not arguments, they do 
not rely on other premises, such as empirical data.   
An easy way to solve this problem is to say films can present explicit 
arguments. Films can do so in various ways: for example, a film that is just a record 
of a philosophy seminar/lecture/presentation where there are philosophers making 
explicit arguments. Wartenberg imagines a film called Justifying Difference that is 
just a record of a lecture given by John Rawls.24 Another example he gives is 
Waking Life (Richard Linklater, 2001), where Robert Solomon, as an animated 
“character,” gives a lecture and talks about existentialism. Other examples could be 
The Pervert’s Guide to Ideology (Sophie Fiennes and Slavoj Žižek, 2012), or the 
American TV series The Good Place (2016–).   
Now, why are these films and TV series not philosophy?   
When philosophers talk about film as philosophy, they are usually interested 
in fiction narrative popular films, like The Matrix. This is because they seem to 
fulfill what Livingston calls the following two conditions for defending a bold FAP 
thesis:   
 
a. The “means condition,” which is “a conception of which sorts of exclusive 
capacities of the cinematic medium are said to make a special contribution 
to philosophy.”   
b. The “results condition,” which requires a “significance and independence 
of the latter contribution.”25   
 
The first condition relates to the so-called medium specific ity, that art forms 
and, in this case, cinema have specific or unique features, such as juxtaposition, 
editing, selective focus of the camera and correlations between soundtrack and 
image, among others. These film abilities, according to Livingston, offer an 
articulated content of a nonlinguistic, but visual form.26 The second condition 
suggests that the philosophical contribution made by the specific cinematic medium 
must be “historically innovative and independent.”27   
Additionally, Livingston argues that one result of accepting such a bold 
thesis with these two conditions is a dilemma of paraphrase: if we cannot 
paraphrase the cinematic philosophical content into text since it is done   
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by exclusive cinematic means, how could we even begin to make sense of such 
content? On the other hand, if we can paraphrase that content, then it is not 
significantly independent and innovative, or, it is too trivial.28 Several versions of a 
bold thesis have been defended by different philosophers to avoid this dilemma.   
Cox and Levine (2012) tried to adopt a “moderate thesis” according to 
which “certain philosophical things are better done in film than in written texts,” 
and “this would not require film to have unique access to its own mode of 
philosophizing or its own branch of philosophical insight.”29 So, even though they 
argue that films can do certain things better than texts, for them there is no need for 
any exclusive cinematic ability to defend that films philosophize, which seems to 
be an attempt to avoid medium essentialism. Now, it seems that to say films can do 
things (or at least unique things) better than texts, we have to say something about 
film’s specific techniques.   
Noël Carroll argued that to defend FAP we need not assume a medium 
essentialism, but the “movie-made philosophy should be recognizably cinematic.”30   
In this same vein, Aaron Smuts argued that we do not have to maintain the 
idea of kinds of exclusive cinematic abilities; we only have to recognize that those 
films that interest philosophers have paradigmatic techniques that “include 
montage, camera angles and movement, and the juxtaposition of word and 
image.”31   
In any case, we could agree that even if we do not require an essentialist 
account of the cinematic medium, we have to rely on some specificity; i.e., it has to 
be the film as a specific art form that philosophizes through its (at least) 
paradigmatic techniques.   
As for the second condition, Carroll questioned the requirement for the film 
to have original and innovative philosophical content. As he states, “little 
philosophy, if any, could survive such a test.”32 We can, however, accept that most 
films do not make historically “innovative” and “original” philosophical 
contributions, and still find them to be unique and valuable.   
It seems, however, that what Livingston is trying to argue is not that the film 
has to have a ground-breaking philosophical discovery, but some originality. We 
can understand that especially when we encounter the commonly made dichotomy 
between real philosophical films and films that are “mere” illustration of a 
philosophical theory. Mind, however, that Wartenberg rejected this dichotomy, 
arguing that illustration can be a valid way of finding cases of FAP.33   
When Livingston identifies the themes addressed by Eino Kaila in 
Bergman’s films, he does not mean to say his films are not philosophical in their 
own right; on the contrary, it seems his argument is that Bergman was inspired by 
Kaila’s philosophy but did not just illustrate his positions. That is why identifying 
links between films to previously defended   
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positions in philosophy may not be a problem. And even if we want to maintain that 
illustration can be good philosophy too, we can support this claim by saying that by 
fulfilling the first condition films philosophize in their own right; i.e., films make 
good philosophical contributions precisely because their own specific techniques 
do so in a way that philosophical texts do not. What seems to be required is that the 
film has some kind of new perspective or insight on a philosophical issue or 
position.   
These are the reasons the previously mentioned films that would be easy 
solutions to the lack of explicitness are not very satisfying to FAP advocates: in all 
cases, arguably there is a strong reliance on verbal means and/or without relevant 
innovation; such films and TV series do not make use of their specific /paradigmatic 
means to make new philosophical insights.34   
Because we are interested in films that philosophize through their 
paradigmatic cinematic techniques that go beyond verbal means, it is hard to see 
how a film makes, cinematically, an explicit argument. It will always lack the kind 
of explicitness that traditional philosophical verbal means like texts can have. Thus, 
when we appeal to thought experiments as tools that philosophy uses, we are still 
left with a problem at hand: philosophical thought experiments, as ambiguous and 
as open as they may be, are usually completed by further explicit explanation. 
   
III   
One solution to this problem is to retrieve to a metaphilosophical clarification: as 
Wartenberg and Carroll say, not all philosophical works are that explicit, and 
sometimes they even are ambiguous. Wartenberg gives the example of the historical 
dispute over how to characterize the precise conclusion of the Transcendental 
Deduction of Categories in Kant, concluding that “just because an argument is 
philosophical, it need not be unambiguous.”35 Carroll too argues that anyone who 
regards Nietzsche’s aphorisms or genealogies or Wittgenstein’s puzzles as 
philosophy will not accept an argument based on such an assumption.36   
A metaphilosophical clarification, however, does not seem very satisfying, 
because it retracts to a defensive position rather than an active one of positively 
acknowledging film’s ambiguity and its own potential mode of philosophizing.   
Another metaphilosophical strategy would be the “reader-response theory” 
where “any text [in this case, work], that gets read as philosophy, from Shakespeare 
to Darwin, counts as philosophy. Philosophy lies in the eye of the beholder.”37 
Nevertheless, we could say that such a strategy, in Smith’s words, “drains the 
debate of part of its lifeblood, leaving us with a rather anemic general solution: 
whatever someone somewhere has designated ‘philosophy’ can serve as a measure 
of whether film can philosophize,” which is a “low threshold to meet.”38   
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This relates to the two kinds of metaphilosophical strategies that Smith says 
FAP advocates can adopt: the “expansive” strategy and the “reductive” strategy. 
The first “begins with a looser, more inclusive conception of philosophy,” and the 
latter “around a specific, narrow conception of philosophical activity.”39 What 
Smith seems to say is that when defending or objecting to FAP we need to defend 
specific conceptions of philosophy, normatively. This may be because the 
acceptance of a looser conception of philosophy facilitates the idea that every film 
can philosophize, and that that might not be a bullet we’d be willing to bite 
(although maybe some philosophers are). In such a case, how would we decide if a 
film is philosophy or not, or if it is bad or good philosophy? That is possible to 
decide only when we defend some kind of “prescriptive” or evaluative normative 
metaphilosophy, i.e., if we state how philosophy “should be done,” and not just do 
“descriptive” metaphilosophy, which is to say how it “has been done” factually.40   
Posed in this metaphilosophical light, we may question in what aspects can 
films be good philosophy. Why it is worth watching films when we have 
philosophical objectives in mind? This question is a version of what Livingston 
calls the rationality objection that we can otherwise call a rationality challenge and 
not so much an objection against FAP.   
Livingston asks: “if we in fact believe a better (for example, more efficient) 
means to our goal is available, would it not indeed be irrational to pass it by?”41 To 
understand this problem, Livingston suggests an analogy with the use of a 
screwdriver to tighten a screw versus the use of a coin:   
 
if you know you can quickly, easily, and very effectively tighten a screw 
with a screwdriver that is ready to hand, or laboriously and imperfectly 
tighten it with a coin, would it not be irrational to prefer the coin (assuming 
all other conditions are equal)?42  
  
Put another way, and applying the question to TEs (as, let us remember, they 
are said to solve the generality objection): why resort to films as TEs as they appear 
in an incomplete version, when we can resort to traditional philosophical means 
(primarily linguistic ones, like books, articles or lectures) capable of explaining the 
TEs’ purposes, framework or conclusions? If we consider that philosophy ought to 
use explicit argumentation, even when it relies on TEs, would it not be irrational to 
watch ambiguous films instead of accessing explicit means?   
So, another way of solving the explicitness objection that does not retreat to 
a deflationary metaphilosophy is to say that a lack of explicitness (or the existence 
of implicit premises in a film) can be advantageous, thus putting forward a 
prescriptive metaphilosophy where the argument is   
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that philosophy can positively benefit from the ambiguous or incomplete character 
of TEs.   
This is what Tom McClelland tried to do with his defense of a “Socratic 
Model.” Instead of explaining specific arguments and conclusions, films can 
“actively prompt us to reach the general and precise propositions characteristic of 
philosophy,”43 and “without stating any philosophical conclusions, you can cleverly 
stimulate an audience into achieving their own insights,”44 such as Socrates did in 
his philosophical dialogues. Here, it is the viewers themselves who do part of the 
philosophical work, and this could be advantageous especially when we are talking 
about TEs, given some problems that philosophical TEs are attacked for having.45   
It seems, however, that relying on the ambiguity or incompleteness of films 
compared to traditional philosophical means does not maintain a FAP bold thesis, 
for traditional philosophical means have the same potential capacity for ambiguity 
and incompleteness. So, we should remind ourselves of the “means condition” and 
ask why we should turn to films when we have an interest in finding philosophical 
TEs, and not to not only traditional philosophical means but also other art forms. 
What do films have that specifically allows them to be better equipped to do good 
if not even better TEs than texts, novels or plays?   
When Thomas E. Wartenberg argues that The Matrix philosophizes through 
specific cinematic techniques,46 that is a way of saying that other artistic or 
traditional philosophical media could not have philosophized in the same way. The 
same seems to happen when Robert Sinnerbrink argues that Terrence Malick’s The 
New World (2005) “cannot be reduced to any specifically philosophical theme, idea 
or perspective.” It is so “new” that it resists any translation into a known 
philosophical thesis. For Sinnerbrink, in this case, philosophy only “accompanies” 
film.47 Thus, he argues, there is a “distinctively cinematic kind of thinking.”48   
We could argue that films do not have anything special about them and that 
they can philosophize in just the same ways as other art forms. Still, it seems 
possible to think that films have some kind of je ne sais quoi, those cinematic 
features that give them the upper hand for making philosophical TEs. Maybe films 
are better at dramatizing ethical dilemmas or imagining and visualizing 
hypothetical future scenarios. This may mean that we could put any work side by 
side with a film and evaluate on a case-by-case basis: maybe there are films that are 
better philosophical TEs than some other TEs found in a traditional philosophical 
medium and vice versa, depending on various factors—it is probably wiser to go to 
the movies to see a TE without explicit argumentation and get the Socratic 
advantage out of it, and read a typical philosophical TE if explicit argumentation is 
required for the purpose at hand, whatever that may be. Let us keep in mind, 
however, that the latter does not diminish any philosophical potential that can be 
found in an “ambiguous” TE: ignoring the potential that cinematic TEs can have 
just because we want   
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to keep relying on explicit arguments, even for academic philosophy’s own interest, 
can be an epistemic flaw by itself.   
 
IV   
So, now we should ask: are there definite objections to film as philosophy? Do the 
generality or the explicitness objections put the FAP hypothesis to rest? Posing this 
question seems to be the same as asking if there are definite objections to certain 
conceptions of philosophy. If a skeptic wants to refuse FAP, it seems adequate to 
do so on metaphilosophical grounds, as Russell and Smith do.   
Responding to their metaphilosophical conceptions with counterexamples 
of philosophers who do not fi t their criteria presumes that they would worry about 
excluding such philosophers from their conception. Russell and Smith might 
respond that appealing to such counterexamples assumes a deflationary or 
institutional49 metaphilosophy, one that argues that philosophy “is whatever the 
people who are employed as philosophers at universities and other institutions do, 
or whatever material librarians catalog as such—end of story.”50 Such 
metaphilosophies as the “prototype and family resemblance” theory that thinks that 
philosophy is whatever that resembles Plato or Descartes’ texts51 may or may not 
be problematic. So, Russell and Smith seem to be defending some kind of 
essentialist metaphilosophy that, as we are already predicting, seems to take the risk 
of excluding too many, even well-known philosophers. And this is not just a 
problem with Smith and Russell’s essentialist accounts; it may be a problem of 
essentialist accounts themselves.   
Defending an “essentialist” metaphilosophy is “to lay down a definition, an 
eternal fence, so what lies within is philosophy, and what lies without is not.”52 
According to Overgaard, Gilbert and Burwood, essentialist metaphilosophies are 
usually “topical” or “methodological”: they try to define philosophy in terms of its 
topics/themes like the “big questions,” or methods like conceptual analysis. We 
could say that philosophy is also sometimes defined by its objectives. For example, 
philosophy can be defined as aiming at discovering the true answer to one of the 
“big questions” in a Platonic sense, or at helping us improve morally.   
The main possible problem with essentialist accounts is that they usually are 
too inclusive or too exclusive: an account of philosophy as conceptual analysis 
excludes too much, and this too seems to be the case with Smith and Russell’s 
accounts, for they exclude too much by insisting on philosophy’s supposed 
explicitness and generality, and an account of philosophy as thinking about the big 
questions includes too much.53 This is why Overgaard et.al. argue that a good 
descriptive metaphilosophy takes both into account, saying that philosophy is 
usually concerned about the fundamental questions and addresses it by “reason and 
argument, broadly conceived” (my emphasis).54   
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Furthermore, Overgaard et.al. suggest how to confront and evaluate each 
metaphilosophical position: it should not be too revisionist, which would imply that 
“most philosophers (past and/or present) have been doing philosophy in completely 
the wrong way,” and it should “explain the relative ‘lack of progress’ characteristic 
of philosophy relative to the natural sciences.”55 That philosophy lacks progress is 
a debatable idea. However, it should be said that we are talking in relative terms, 
contrasting with the process we see in the sciences. Eric Dietrich proposes a thought 
experiment in order to understand why, according to him, philosophy does not 
progress.   
 
Imagine that Aristotle … pops forward to today, on a well-known campus 
somewhere in some English-speaking country.... Curious about the state of 
knowledge, he finds a physics lecture and sits in. What he hears shocks him. 
A feather and an iron ball fall at the same rate in vacuum … Sadly, he 
trundles off to a philosophy class—a metaphysics class, as it turns out... He 
knows exactly what the professor is talking about... Then Aristotle goes on 
an ethics class, where he learns of the current importance of what is 
apparently “virtue ethics.” He recognises it immediately.56   
 
This seems to be an indication that, contrary to science where, for example, 
“Darwin’s conclusions are regarded as true,” on the other hand in philosophy we 
still do not know whether a philosopher’s theory is right or not; for example, “Mill’s 
conclusions are not regarded as true, but rather, interesting and important.”57 Now, 
as Dietrich argues, this is not to say that philosophy does not transform somehow, 
especially in its different methods or technical language; however, it seems 
undeniable that philosophy at least does not progress into an agreement about 
propositions as science does.   
So, beyond not denying this relative lack of progress, Overgaard et.al. 
explain why any metaphilosophy should not be too revisionist: because they would 
be suggesting that philosophy should be something that “does not count as 
philosophy at all.” They give the following example of a similar position: “consider 
someone who suggested that football would be better played without goalkeepers. 
One’s reply would be that this might be an interesting game but it would not be 
football.”58   
 
V 
So now, let us take a few steps back and remember Russell and Smith’s 
metaphilosophical accounts. According to Russell, philosophy aims at establishing 
general theses and does so through explicit argumentation, and according to Smith 
philosophy is valued for its explicitness and   
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clarity since it has cognitive ends. More recently he also argued that philosophy 
follows three specific norms:   
 
1. Rational warrant: philosophy’s “attention to the rational—or nonrational 
or irrational underpinning of our beliefs and practices.” The rational assessment of 
these underpinning is done, according to Smith, through the tools of logic.   
2. Empirical support/soundness: we should also consider the empirical 
evidence at our disposal.   
3. Reflective maturity: inspired by Rawls’ Reflective equilibrium, Smith 
defends that the philosophical conclusion we reach should be “the product of a 
sustained process of reflection, of testing our beliefs and assumptions by examining 
them from a multitude of angles.”59   
 
As we saw earlier, Carroll argues that philosophy is not always regulated by 
explicitness, and we could give counterexamples to all these norms. For one, there 
are lots of philosophies purely a priori, not recurring to empirical evidence. For 
example, David Chalmers relies on the conceivability of “P-Zombies” to show how 
physicalism is not a necessary theory of the conscious mind.60, 61 And if we apply 
Overgaard et al.’s criteria, we see how problematic these conceptions can be. 
Russell and Smith seem to be “too parochial, too narrowly bound to an analytic 
conception of philosophy,” as Smith puts it.62 We can see how revisionist they are.   
Furthermore, their accounts seem to be essentialist: Russell attaches 
philosophy to one of its methods (explicit argumentation), and Smith attaches 
philosophy to three of its methods, as we saw. Even so, Smith’s prescriptive 
metaphilosophy turns philosophy into something narrow and uninteresting. Like 
football, philosophy has a history that includes different rules and protagonists. 
How interesting would it be to watch football if we only knew that its main aim is 
to score goals and that it has various rules to be followed, unaware of its historic 
and social framework? Surely, football is a game with that aim and those rules, but 
it’s also more than that: it involves stars such as Cristiano Ronaldo, supporters’ 
clubs, different equipments and so on. As such, philosophy does not have just one 
aim, nor is it subsumed under its narrow rules. We could say that if football’s rules 
are not followed it is no longer the same game; philosophy, however, has the 
advantage of being able to change its own rules, as it has done throughout history 
with various kinds of additions.   
Within the FAP debate, this seems to be what commonly happens: usually, 
philosophers do not think much about what they do; they just do it. Despite this, 
when someone poses the FAP hypothesis, that films can philosophize in their own 
right “in just the same ways as philosophers do,” the reaction seems to be a 
retraction to narrow conceptions of philosophy in order to maintain professional 
philosophers’ exclusive access to the field. So, it seems that philosophers and 
theorists such as Russell   
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and Smith would rather defend a narrow conception of philosophy, as problematic 
as it is, than to accept that philosophy may be something that films can do too, in 
order to preserve a clear categorization of disciplines. Sinnerbrink and Wartenberg 
argued that this derives from the Platonic prejudice against art, and results in a 
“philosophical disenfranchisement of film.”63   
Now, if their metaphilosophical accounts are not very adequate, then we can 
ask what kind of metaphilosophy we should defend when we address FAP. Let us 
remember that, according to Smith, a mere descriptive philosophy is not very 
interesting. However, it might be a starting point.   
Wartenberg presented his own metaphilosophical account to defend FAP. 
To him, there are three conceptions we should regard inclusively:   
 
1. Philosophy as approaching a set of “eternal questions,” such as knowing 
what a moral action is (a topical account)64   
2. Philosophy as a meta-discipline, i.e., as a discipline that asks questions 
about the nature of other disciplines, such as sciences and arts (which also seems to 
be a topical account)   
3. Philosophy as a set of methods, as the use of explicit argumentation and 
formal logic, or the use of thought experiments (a methodological account)   
 
Wartenberg argues that we should regard these conceptions in a “mutually 
supportive” way precisely to avoid excluding or including too much.65 This account 
seems to be more adequate and have better explanatory power. Simon Blackburn 
argues that philosophy and literature both lack progress, which he doesn’t regard as 
a problem, and that it is not a “sufficient answer to this to proclaim that philosophy 
aims at truth and literature does not.” He states that “a serious work of fiction aims 
at truth about what matters.”66 In this case, as philosophy, a film can aim at “truth 
about what matters,” and as in traditional philosophy we see the use of TEs as a 
means to achieve truth; maybe films can be such TEs, imaginary cases that aim at 
truth.   
Mulhall’s metaphilosophy seems to suffer from the opposite “problem” to 
Russell and Smith’s, for it seems to be too inclusive. Drawing from Cavell, he 
argues that:   
 
1. There is no essential break between natural human reflection and 
“inveterate Reflectiveness of the philosopher,” the distinction being that the 
philosopher questions more persistently.   
2. Philosophy can occur anywhere or at any time—any human who has a 
certain practice may question its nature and resources, and a filmmaker can make 
the same kind of radical questioning (or philosophy).   
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  3. Since philosophy questions and reflects other human activities, it must 
do the same about itself.67   
 
It seems that this would imply that every human work can be philosophy, 
which seems to be counterintuitive and not very helpful when we try to decide when 
a film philosophizes or not. It is probably more reasonable to maintain some kind 
of philosophical identity, something we can point at and say: “Ah! That is 
philosophy!”   
It is also possible to say that philosophers are not very well equipped to 
decide if films can philosophize, and what philosophy is. As Gary Gutting puts it, 
the main reason metaphilosophy is not that interesting is that when philosophers 
defend their metaphilosophy they have a “dogmatic attitude that derives the nature 
of philosophy from controversial philosophical doctrines” and “an abstract, overly 
generalized approach that pays no attention to the details of philosophical 
practice.”68 Wartenberg also thinks the question of what philosophy is an 
“intractable” problem.69 It can be in this line that we arrive at the idea that 
philosophers cannot decide what philosophy is, and that we should think about the 
FAP subject in non-philosophical terms, as John Ó Maoilearca defends. 70   
 
VI   
Where does this leave us? I would suggest that we should advance from a general 
open and democratic attitude, which does not mean loosening or expanding our 
conception of philosophy, but just recognizing that philosophy is not the only 
human activity related to thinking. But when we engage with film analysis, when 
we find a film that we think philosophizes, we can try to do prescriptive 
metaphilosophy where we specifically say how the film thinks for itself, in which 
ways, why it is specifically thinking philosophically and why that is philosophically 
important.   
So maybe we can say, first, that films think (and not philosophize per se), 
as philosophy and other human activities and works think. As Mulhall says, films 
seem to be more prone to thinking about their own means of possibility, so they are 
in the “condition of philosophy,” in this case, philosophy of film. As he states, 
philosophy raises “questions about the basic techniques, resources and 
presuppositions of cinema.”71 However, Mulhall notes, “in theoretical writings 
about film films themselves are assumed to be silent with respect to such question” 
and assume that “at best, they provide the data in relation to which possible answers 
to such questions must at some point be assessed for validity.”72 When I say that 
films can think, or that the filmmakers think through and about film and other 
philosophical subjects, it is because, as Mulhall says, “films—like novels, plays and 
paintings—are the products of intentional human practical activity,” and so they 
“can have representational content and can take pretty much anything as their 
subject matter.”73   
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Let us remember that Mulhall’s conception of philosophy is that it is linked 
to Reflectiveness and the questioning of the nature and resources of human 
activities and that philosophy itself seems to be a discipline or even professional 
field that radicalizes the questioning. Mulhall quotes Cavell on this idea when he 
says that philosophy is “a willingness not to think about something other than what 
ordinary human beings think about.”74 It is a fact that every human, at some point, 
thinks about the morality of certain actions, the justice of certain principles, the 
meaning of their existing, the nature of art and so on. These are the “big,” “eternal,” 
philosophical questions.   
However, as we have seen, philosophy should not be defined by its topics, 
since such a definition “launches too wide of a net.”75 Thus, to have a more precise, 
but still not too narrow conception of philosophy, we should add the methodological 
side, as we saw. Philosophy uses thought experiments as one of its methods to tackle 
the general philosophical questions. Therefore, we can compromise with a 
moderate FAP: some films think philosophically; i.e., they think about 
philosophical issues through a philosophical method. This seems to be a general 
hypothesis, but it has to be “tested” on a case-by-case basis—or, through a 
particular or “local” way as Wartenberg and Mulhall defend.76 Maybe there are 
films that are TEs on philosophical questions, and if there are, maybe we can see 
their relations to other works that do the same, whether in traditional philosophy or 
in other media. We can also see what said film specifically offers to the subject 
through its paradigmatic techniques. And if professional philosophers take this film 
to further develop their arguments or theories, this does not have to be seen as a 
problem nor does it mean that it was the philosopher who actually philosophized, 
since philosophy and cinema are not isolated from each other and can do the same 
through different means. The same inversely applies: if a filmmaker is not clearly 
endorsing a specific philosophical theory, it does not mean that the film is not doing 
philosophy at all.   
This question matters because it allows us to discover new ways of 
philosophizing. It is possible that all of us, as well as professional philosophers, are 
losing some particular perspective that can, somehow, be fundamental. Maybe a 
film can tell us what philosophy might be, as Mulhall puts it,77 and maybe we are 
not seeing a new way of thinking philosophically when we retract to a skeptical 
attitude and a too narrow and closed conception of philosophy. Additionally, even 
professional philosophers should be interested in this, since they should be open to 
different ideas of philosophy; otherwise, as Mulhall says, philosophy fails to do 
what it does about other disciplines: thinking about its own nature, limits, 
possibilities and so on.78   
It seems, so far, that we are not able to decide if objections against FAP are 
definite or not, because that would mean deciding if there are definite narrow 
conceptions of philosophy. We can say, however, that  
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are not only non-democratic but actually implausible too. As we saw, Smith and 
Russell’s objections against the possibility of films being able to philosophize are, 
for example, based on metaphilosophies that are too revisionist.   
Instead of making general objections against FAP relying on problematic 
conceptions of philosophy, the discipline can really gain something from opening 
itself to other ways of thinking, and when we address a film philosophically, we 
can evaluate if and how it is important for our philosophical endeavor. Adding a 
new means to philosophize does not seem to defy our common conceptions of 
philosophy, for it does not seem that any advocate of FAP argues that philosophy 
has not been done correctly over the millennia. Film is a relatively new human 
activity, and arguments for FAP do not seem to question our past and present 
philosophy in extreme ways; they are only suggestions of how, besides traditional 
philosophical means, philosophy can also be made through other new means.     
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